1. Integrity of Democratic Elections
Definition
Unconstitutional changes of government are an overthrow of a constitutionally elected government. Therefore, elections are an integral aspect of the definition of UCG. Defined under article 23 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, in universal terms, are determined as having to be conducted with integrity if it is based on the democratic principles of universal suffrage and political equality as reflected in international standards and national constitutional and legal frameworks in which the freeness and fairness of the process are guaranteed. Its management must also reflect that constitutional and legal imperative and respect for human rights such as freedom to form political parties, freedoms of expression, association, and of the press among others.
The term ‘integrity of elections’ is interchangeably with ‘electoral integrity’. The report defines electoral integrity as ‘any election that is based on the democratic principles of universal suffrage and political equality as reflected in international standards and agreements, and is professional, impartial, and transparent in its preparation and administration throughout the electoral cycle.
Findings
1. In most AU member states there is a general acceptance and institutionalisation of the principles of electoral integrity and democratic transition of power through free and fair elections.
2. There are instances of departure from constitutional and legal frameworks. This may occur if the rule of law and popular participation in electoral processes are absent, when electoral processes are irregular, or in the absence of human rights and fundamental freedoms. When the rules governing elections are not strictly adhered to it may compromise the principles and benchmarks for electoral integrity.
3. Instability may result if elections are not considered credible or if the will of the people is subverted by the incumbent administration as was the case in Nigeria (1993), Ivory Coast (2012), Kenya (2017) and Malawi (2019).
4. Political party and campaign financing can affect electoral integrity and may result in UCG.
5. Provisions outlined in Article 23 of the AU Charter are meant for prevention of UCG.
Recommendations
1. Prerequisites for Electoral Integrity:
1.1 Build the rule of law to substantiate claims to human rights and electoral justice.
1.2 Build professional, competent, credible, independent Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs)
1.3 Create institutions and norms of multiparty competition and division of power
1.4 Remove barriers – legal, administrative, political, economic, and social – to universal and equal political participation
1.5 Regulate uncontrolled, undisclosed, and opaque political finance.
2. The AU Commission needs to develop clear and consistent guidelines that will not only allow it to monitor elections but also state the conditions under which it will declare any elections that it monitors as free and fair.
3. That the AU develops Guidelines and Principles for Political Party Financing guided by international best practices.
4. The AU is encouraged to adopt guidelines that normalise the requirement to establish, through legislation, quotas for women and minorities in national electoral systems. Member states of the AU should be encouraged to ensure that citizens in the diaspora are able to vote in line with Article 3(7) of ACDEG.
2. Diversity Management and Human Rights
Definition
Human rights violations that incite UCG include denial of political space to political opponents and restriction of access to information and internet access; police brutality in the form of arbitrary arrest and illegal detention; extrajudicial execution, torture, forced confession, kidnapping, female genital mutilation and other harmful practices including rape, harmful funeral rites and denial of women’s inheritance to women, child labour and the use of child soldiers.
Identities can be characterised by 'primordial and social identity markers’ such as those based on ethnicity, race, clan, kinship, religion, region, nationality, citizenship, language, gender, age, and origin; other identities are based on modes of production, social classes, institutional systems, occupations, political affiliation, professional organisations, and civil society organisations.
Findings
1. Ordinary citizens can also abuse the right of fellow citizens to a political preference through abuses of freedom of expression in the forms of hate speech and propagation of false information on social media.
2. Although different identities can co-exist peacefully and cooperate in local and national governance within communities and at national level, managing diversity remains a challenge in Africa. Governance deficits and absence of progressive and substantive policies to manage diversity relations can result in marginalisation of some identity groups, denial of human rights and restricted access to opportunities to such identity groups, and identity-based discrimination and exclusion. Poor diversity management may result in intractable and destabilizing inter-identity or diversity-based conflicts, often divisive due to exaggerated differences (real and imagined) between identities.
3. In African politics, poor diversity management allows political parties to emerge along identity markers; appointments in senior government positions and national security institutions have also been driven by clan politics, kinship politics, politics of autochthony, politics of regionalism, politics of belonging as well as exclusion and marginalisation of critical components of the society such as the youth and women. This can cause instability and polarization, especially when competition for access to power, domination, opportunities and resources intensifies. The inability of political elites to manage diversity with adequate respect for human rights can be exploited by self-interested military officers and/or external powers to effect UCG.
4. If governments fail to understand the different priority human rights demands and grievances of the different identity groups (including the poor, vulnerable, disadvantaged, marginalised and minorities) such as the demand for transformation, equitable wealth distribution, decent employment, living wages, land redistribution, among other human rights demands, it creates social and political conditions that foments UCGs. The mismanagement of diversity, therefore, affects human rights and can create conditions that lead to UCG.
Recommendations
The following recommendations are suggested for adoption by AU member states at national, regional and continental levels:
1. Promote and institutionalise inclusive political participation: Member states are encouraged to adopt more inclusive political systems that allow participation of all registered political parties and encourage a culture of power sharing.
2. Domesticate human rights instruments into law: The normative instruments for managing diversity and ensuring respect for human rights need to be strengthened and given domestic force of law in the AU, EU, UN, and RECs. Member states are encouraged to strengthen those laws and regulations such as freedom of information, assembly and association, and asset disclosure by public officials that empower citizens to hold public officials to account.
3. Operationalise the responsibility to protect: Article 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive Act of 2000 establishes the right of the Union to intervene in a member state to prevent grave violations of human rights, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The AU is encouraged to consider integrating provisions for military intervention into the escalation ladder of sanctions for countries where UCG has taken place and where there is evidence of gross and severe threats to civilian life, particularly that of women and children.
4. Introduce political education: AU organs and member states are encouraged to legally recognise human rights as a tool and product of the dignity of Africans, at home and globally. Member states are encouraged to introduce political education across all levels of education, beginning in primary school. The AU is encouraged to introduce a continental programme that champions police reforms and retraining throughout Africa, based on a protocol and agreed guidelines.
5. Protocol on free movement of persons: right of residence and right of establishment. Domestication of the protocol will ensure protection of human rights of displaced populations and prevent socioeconomic and political disenfranchisement that may compel such populations to join mercenary groups and become destabilising elements.
3. Constitutional Order and State Legitimacy
Definition
Constitutional order in the context of UCG is defined herein as a reasonably stable set of institutions through which a nation’s fundamental decisions are made over a sustained period, and the principles that guide those decisions. These institutions and principles provide the structure within which ordinary political contention occurs. Constitutional order includes the Courts, national political parties, parliaments, and the presidency.
Findings
Evidence from some countries suggests that the public supported coups and that effective separation of powers and checks and balances was lacking. It was also suggested that power is concentrated in the executive arm of government, which renders the constitutional roles of the legislature and the judiciary ineffective in placing checks on the executive authority. The report notes concern regarding foreign interference in electoral and security matters as a trigger for UCG.
Recommendations
1. Regulate constitutional reforms: Frequent making, unmaking and remaking of constitutions, whether by revision or crafting of new constitutions should be avoided. Member states are encouraged to undertake all constitutional amendments on presidential term limits through a permanent constitution review mechanism in which no political party dominates or has exclusive powers to review and recommend amendments to the constitution.
2. Legislate presidential term limits: Member states are encouraged to put in place or restore definitive provisions for presidential term limits and limit presidential appointment powers with strict criteria for appointment and promotion of public official.
3. Guarantee judicial independence and credibility: To depoliticise judicial appointments, less than half of the members of appointment committees should have direct or indirect links to the executive and the legislature. Member states should broadcast and televise judicial appointment hearings by public representatives. To enhance the credibility of judicial rulings from the perspective of equity and perception of fairness, member states are encouraged to ensure proportional representation of women in the judiciary.
4. Mitigate foreign influences on security and UCG: The AU and RECs are encouraged to implement the recommendations included in the PSC report on the State of Foreign Military Presence in Africa: Implications on the Implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy.
4. Economic Governance and Public Sector Accountability
Definition
Weak performance of African countries in various aspects of economic governance and public sector accountability, including natural resources governance, public finance management, public services delivery, debt management, money laundering and illicit financial flows, and corruption are reflected in poor economic performance and outcomes that can be measured by different economic indicators. The limitations in achieving development goals and dissatisfaction of the public with the administration and its policies that result, coupled with erosion of confidence towards institutions are fertile ground for political instability that could lead to UCG.
Findings
Illicit demonstrates and weak economic governance: Evidence from the UCG targeted-review countries demonstrates a link between UCG, illicit financial flows, and weak economic governance, reflected in high inflation, growing budget deficit and debt, poverty, inequality, and unemployment, as well as low growth rates and pervasive corruption and lack of transparency and accountability. From a procyclical perspective, growing fragility, conflict, violence and sustained political instability resulting from UCG also contribute to weak economic performance, which adversely affects government finances, basic service delivery and infrastructure, and further hampers development.
Recommendations
1. Reconcile economic governance instruments with the sanction’s regime. The AU is encouraged to consider the different aspects of economic governance when reformulating the framework on UCG. The AU should also consider targeted economic sanctions to ensure that the cost of sanctions outweighs the benefits of maintaining the UCG status quo.
2. Improve policy transparency and efficacy: Member states are encouraged to strengthen transparency in policy making and institutions and build their capacity to enhance economic governance policies by promoting debate and establishing a broad and inclusive economic policy community that includes national entrepreneurs and industrialists within and beyond the respective states.
3. Strengthen the capacity and autonomy of public accountability institutions (for example, anti-corruption commissions and financial intelligence agencies) to fight corruption and money laundering. Bold natural resource governance measures in accordance with the relevant Continental Framework, will facilitate prudent exploitation of African natural resources. This will improve people’s lives and fosters inclusive community development through value addition, beneficiation, and industrialisation.
4. Review national legislation on control of illicit financial flows: Member states are encouraged to strengthen legislation and institutions responsible for combatting illicit financial flows used to fund UCG.
5. Increase public investment in social services: By increasing their public social investment, member states can improve per capita expenditure in health, education, public security, and other social protections for the improvement of welfare, particularly of women and children and vulnerable groups.
5. Popular uprising, Militarisation and Terrorism
Definition
Member states of the AU are witnessing an upsurge in popular uprisings like the Arab Spring, coups, and terrorism because of deficiencies in border management, and organised nationalism, which has had a significant impact on the widespread spread of transnational organised crime associated with international terrorism. Unlike the first three decades after independence, which were characterised by indifference in the face of coups, African leaders are now determined to stem the tide through a combination of continental and sub-regional norms and collective action.
Findings
1. The principle of sovereignty and election-based democracy: The AU response to popular uprisings is a challenge because of the principle of sovereignty and the focus on election-based democracy. There are thus few standards to guide the response during political transitions arising from mass movements. There is also limited scope on the role of the army during a popular uprising.
2. Nation-building challenges: The trend of popular uprisings in Africa suggests that there are profound state- or nation-building challenges in the countries concerned. In some cases, nation-building has been derailed and interrupted by coups d’état, while in those where no coups have taken place since decolonisation, uprisings are the result of discontent with diversity mismanagement and human rights abuses, such as sexual violence against women and children, the child soldier phenomenon, destruction of family structure and society, economic exclusion, poor public sector accountability or questionable credibility of elections.
3. Intervention in popular uprisings: There are challenges with respect to the role of the African Union modalities for intervening with respect to popular uprising to restore peace and security. Similarly, the jurisdiction and capacity of the African Standby Force and the monitoring and intervention missions under the specified circumstances are yet to be revisited.
4. Overlapping mandates: There is a strong suggestion of an overlap of mandates between the AU and ECOWAS in responding to military coups. The two institutions must thus coordinate their efforts, especially in matters of defence and security considering the spread of coups in the continent in recent months, as well as the constant security threats.
5. Civil–military relations: It is important to manage civil–military relations not only in the context of UCG and member states in transition but also with respect to broader governance issues.
6. Criminalisation of UCG: The extension of jurisdiction of the yet to be operationalized African Court of Justice and Human Rights over crimes under international law and transnational crimes, including UCG by the AU is a laudable initiative. The criminalisation of UCG by the AU will certainly deter perpetrators of UCG once the Court is operationalized. This is due to the fact that it is almost impossible to bring to justice leaders that have come to power through UCG in national Courts.
Recommendations
1. An institutional definition of popular uprising. The existing normative framework should be reviewed to remove ambiguity that arises usually in situations of ‘popular uprisings’ that lead to UCG.
2. Para. 83 of the Final AU High Level Panel Report on the Situation in Egypt: In light of the difficulties encountered in applying the AU norms on UCG, particularly in the context of popular uprisings, the Panel recommends elaboration of a guideline for determining the compatibility of popular uprisings with AU norms on UCG.
3. It is further proposed that ‘popular uprising’ be defined based on the AU’s responses to different contexts.
4. Integrate popular uprising into normative frameworks. The report found that existing AU frameworks do not sufficiently or effectively provide for the response of the AU to popular uprising.
5. Enhance AU–REC cooperation. The report encourages full coordination between the AU and RECs to avoid conflict in the process of imposing sanctions.
6. Domestication of key AU instruments. The AU must make domestication of a selected key international and regional instruments and conventions and adherence to agreed standards that guarantee the rights of peoples and prevent any violations against peaceful citizens a priority.
7. Legislate and implement measures to professionalise the military. AU to develop codes of conduct to support member states align military mandates and protocols with constitutional obligations and with international human rights and humanitarian law standards. Professional standards must be updated regularly; technical competence of the military is critical.
8. Sanction non-compliance with court rulings. The AU should institutionalise mechanisms to require immediate commitment and compliance with the decisions of the ACHPR, and sanctions in cases of non-compliance.
9. Foster the implementation of Article 14 of the African Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance which aims at strengthening and institutionalizing constitutional civilian control over the armed and security forces to ensure the consolidation of democracy and constitutional order.